The successor, however, of Pythagoras, is acknowledged by all men to (Part 2)

Of these, the monad is assumed as the first, because, as we have before observed, it is the principle of all even, odd, and evenly-odd numbers, and the nature of it is simple. But the three successive numbers receive their composition according to the even and the odd; because every number is not alone even, nor alone odd. Hence the even and the odd receive two tetractys, according to multiplication; the even indeed, in a duple ratio; for 2 is the first of even numbers, and increases from the monad by duplication. But the odd number is increased in a triple ratio; for 3 is the first of odd numbers, and is itself increased from the monad by triplication. Hence the monad is common to both these, being itself even and odd. The second number, however, in even and double numbers is 2; but in odd and triple numbers 3. The third among even numbers is 4; but among odd numbers is 9. And the fourth among even numbers is 8; but among odd numbers is 27.

{ 1. 2. 4. 8. } { 1. 3. 9. 27. }

In these numbers the more perfect ratios of symphonies are found; and in these also a tone is comprehended. The monad, however, contains the productive principle of a point. But the second numbers 2 and 3 contain the principle of a side, since they are incomposite, and first, are measured by the monad, and naturally measure a right line. The third terms are 4 and 9, which are in power a square superficies, since they are equally equal. And the fourth terms 8 and 27 being equally equally equal, are in power a cube. Hence from these numbers, and this tetractys, the increase takes place from a point to a solid. For a side follows after a point, a superficies after a side, and a solid after a superficies. In these numbers also, Plato in the Timæus constitutes the soul. But the last of these seven numbers, i. e. 27, is equal to all the numbers that precede it; for 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 8 + 9 = 27. There are, therefore, two tetractys of numbers, one of which subsists by addition, but the other by multiplication, and they comprehend musical, geometrical, and arithmetical ratios, from which also the harmony of the universe consists.

But the third tetractys is that which according to the same analogy or proportion comprehends the nature of all magnitude. For what the monad was in the former tetractys, that a point is in this. What the numbers 2 and 3, which are in power a side, were in the former tetractys, that the extended species of a line, the circular and the right, are in this; the right line indeed subsisting in conformity to the even number, since it is terminated[107] by two points; but the circular in conformity to the odd number, because it is comprehended by one line which has no end. But what in the former tetractys the square numbers 4 and 9 were, that the two-fold species of planes, the rectilinear and the circular, are in this. And what the cube numbers 8 and 27 were in the former, the one being an even, but the other an odd number, that the two solids, one of which has a hollow superficies, as the sphere and the cylinder, but the other a plane superficies, as the cube and pyramid, are in this tetractys. Hence, this is the third tetractys, which gives completion to every magnitude, from a point, a line, a superficies, and a solid.

The fourth tetractys is of the simple bodies fire, air, water, and earth, which have an analogy according to numbers. For what the monad was in the first tetractys, that fire is in this. But the duad is air, the triad is water, and the tetrad is earth. For such is the nature of the elements according to tenuity and density of parts. Hence fire has to air the ratio of 1 to 2; but to water, the ratio of 1 to 3; and to earth, the ratio of 1 to 4. In other respects also they are analogous to each other.

The fifth tetractys is of the figures of the simple bodies. For the pyramid, indeed, is the figure of fire; the octaedron, of air; the icosaedron, of water; and the cube, of earth.

The sixth tetractys is of things rising into existence through the vegetative life. And the seed, indeed, is analogous to the monad and a point. But if it increases in length it is analogous to the duad and a line; if in breadth, to the triad and a superficies; but if in thickness, to the tetrad and a solid.

The seventh tetractys is of communities; of which the principle indeed, and as it were monad, is man; the duad is a house; the triad a street; and the tetrad a city. For a nation consists of these. And these indeed are the material and sensible tetractys.

The eighth tetractys consists of the powers which form a judgment of things material and sensible, and which are of a certain intelligible nature. And these are, intellect, science, opinion, and sense. And intellect, indeed, corresponds in its essence to the monad; but science to the duad; for science is the science of a certain thing. Opinion subsists between science and ignorance; but sense is as the tetrad. For the touch which is common to all the senses being fourfold, all the senses energize according to contact.

The ninth tetractys is that from which the animal is composed, the soul and the body. For the parts of the soul, indeed, are the rational, the irascible, and the epithymetic, or that which desires external good; and the fourth is the body in which the soul subsists.

The tenth tetractys is of the seasons of the year, through which all things rise into existence, viz. the spring, the summer, the autumn, and the winter.

And the eleventh is of the ages of man, viz. of the infant, the lad, the man, and the old man.

Hence there are eleven tetractys. The first is that which subsists according to the composition of numbers. The second, according to the multiplication of numbers. The third subsists according to magnitude. The fourth is of the simple bodies. The fifth is of figures. The sixth is of things rising into existence through the vegetative life. The seventh is of communities. The eighth is the judicial power. The ninth is of the parts of the animal. The tenth is of the seasons of the year. And the eleventh is of the ages of man. All of them however are proportional to each other. For what the monad is in the first and second tetractys, that a point is in the third; fire in the fourth; a pyramid in the fifth; seed in the sixth; man in the seventh; intellect in the eighth; and so of the rest. Thus, for instance, the first tetractys is 1. 2. 3. 4. The second is the monad, a side, a square, and a cube. The third is a point, a line, a superficies, and a solid. The fourth is fire, air, water, earth. The fifth the pyramid, the octaedron, the icosaedron, and the cube. The sixth, seed, length, breadth and depth. The seventh, man, a house, a street, a city. The eighth, intellect, science, opinion, sense. The ninth, the rational, the irascible, and the epithymetic parts, and the body. The tenth, the spring, summer, autumn, winter. The eleventh, the infant, the lad, the man, and the old man.

The world also, which is composed from these tetractys, is perfect, being elegantly arranged in geometrical, harmonical, and arithmetical proportion; comprehending every power, all the nature of number, every magnitude, and every simple and composite body. But it is perfect, because all things are the parts of it, but it is not itself the part of any thing. Hence, the Pythagoreans are said to have first used the before-mentioned oath, and also the assertion that “all things are assimilated to number.”

P. 111. _This number is the first that partakes of every number, and when divided in every possible way, receives the power of the numbers subtracted, and of those that remain._

Because 6 consists of 1, 2 and 3, the two first of which are the principles of all number, and also because 2 and 3 are the first even and odd, which are the sources of all the species of numbers; the number 6 may be said to partake of every number. In what Iamblichus afterwards adds, I suppose he alludes to 6 being a perfect number and therefore equal to all its parts.

P. 134. _Not to step above the beam of the balance._

This is the 14th Symbol in the Protreptics of Iamblichus, whose explanation of it is as follows: “This symbol exhorts us to the exercise of justice, to the honoring equality and moderation in an admirable degree, and to the knowledge of justice as the most perfect virtue, to which the other virtues give completion, and without which none of the rest are of any advantage. It also admonishes us, that it is proper to know this virtue not in a careless manner, but through theorems and scientific demonstrations. But this knowledge is the business of no other art and science than the Pythagoric philosophy alone, which in a transcendent degree honors disciplines before every thing else.”

The following extract also from my Theoretic Arithmetic, (p. 194.), will in a still greater degree elucidate this symbol. The information contained in it is derived from the anonymous author of a very valuable work entitled Θεολογουμενα Αριθμητικης _Theologumena Arithmeticæ_, and which has lately been reprinted at Leipsic, “The Pythagoreans called the pentad providence and justice, because it equalizes things unequal, justice being a medium between excess and defect, just as 5 is the middle of all the numbers that are equally distant from it on both sides as far as to the decad, some of which it surpasses, and by others is surpassed, as may be seen in the following arrangement:

1. 4. 7. 2. 5. 8. 3. 6. 9.

“For here, as in the middle of the beam of a balance, 5 does not depart from the line of the equilibrium, while one scale is raised, and the other is depressed.

“In the following arrangement also, viz. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, it will be found that the sum of the numbers which are posterior, is triple the sum of those that are prior to 5; for 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 = 30; but 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10. If therefore the numbers on each side of 5 represent the beam of a balance, 5 being the tongue of it, when a weight depresses the beam, an obtuse angle is produced by the depressed part with the tongue, and an acute angle by the elevated part of the beam. Hence it is worse to do than to suffer an injury: and the authors of the injury verge downward as it were to the infernal regions; but the injured tend upward as it were to the Gods, imploring the divine assistance. Hence the meaning of the Pythagoric symbol is obvious, “Pass not above the beam of the balance.” Since however injustice pertains to inequality, in order to correct this, equalization is requisite, that the beam of the balance may remain on both sides without obliquity. But equalization is effected by addition and subtraction. Thus if 4 is added to 5, and 4 is also taken from 5, the number 9 will be produced on one side, and 1 on the other, each of which is equally distant from 5. Thus too, if 3 is added to 5, and is also subtracted from it, on the one side 8 will be produced, and on the other 2. If 2 is added to 5, and likewise taken from it, 7 and 3 will be produced. And by adding 1 to 5, and subtracting 3 from it, 6 and 4 will be the result; in all which instances, the numbers produced are equidistant from 5, and the sum of each couple is equal to 10.”

P. 161. _Such as dig not fire with a sword._

This is the 9th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by Iamblichus. “This symbol exhorts to prudence. For it excites in us an appropriate conception with respect to the propriety of not opposing sharp words to a man full of fire and wrath, nor contending with him. For frequently by words you will agitate and disturb an ignorant man, and will yourself suffer things dreadful and unpleasant.” Heraclitus also testifies to the truth of this symbol. For he says, “It is difficult to fight with anger: for whatever is necessary to be done redeems the soul.” And this he says truly. For many, by gratifying anger, have changed the condition of their soul, and have made death preferable to life. But by governing the tongue, and being quiet, friendship is produced from strife, the fire of anger being extinguished; and you yourself will not appear to be destitute of intellect.”

P. 200. _But this follows from the whole being naturally prior to the part, and not the part to the whole._

For whole co-subverts, but is not co-subverted by part: since if whole is taken away, part also is taken away; but the contrary does not follow.

P. 231. _Such therefore as hope the intellective and gnostic part of virtue, are denominated skilful and intelligent; but such as have the ethical and pre-elective part of it, are denominated useful and equitable._

The following account of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the Phædo of Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the irascible, and through temperance the epithymetic power, (or the power which is the source of desire;) but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic. These virtues too follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phædo. Prior to these however are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one may be induced to think from the name, but also orectically: for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the political: for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theætetus.

According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation of the virtues besides these, viz, the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illuminated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes, as it were, solar-form; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and energizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us intellect; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when possessing the physical virtues, we know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies); so from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the Universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic supermundane; but as possessing the theoretic we know intellectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato in the Phædo calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical σκιογραφιαι _adumbrations_, because their possessors only know _that_ the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know _why_ they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that Plato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. He also separates them in another way, viz. that the political are not telestic, i. e. do not pertain to mystic ceremonies, but that the cathartic and theoretic are telestic. Hence, Olympiodorus adds, the cathartic virtues are denominated from the purification which is used in the mysteries; but the theoretic from perceiving things divine. On this account he accords with the Orphic verses, that

The soul that uninitiated dies, Plung’d in the blackest mire in Hades lies.

For initiation is the divinely-inspired energy of the virtues. Olympiodorus also further observes, that by the thyrsus-bearers, Plato means those that energize according to the political virtues, but by the Bacchuses those that exercise the cathartic virtues. For we are bound in matter as Titans, through the great partibility of our nature; but we rise from the dark mire as Bacchuses. Hence we become more prophetic at the time of death: and Bacchus is the inspective guardian of death, because he is likewise of every thing pertaining to the Bacchic sacred rites.

All the virtues likewise exhibit their proper characters, these being every where common, but subsisting appropriately in each. For the characteristic property of fortitude is the not declining to things subordinate; of temperance, a conversion from an inferior nature; of justice, a proper energy, and which is adapted to being; and of prudence, the election and selection of things good and evil. Olympiodorus farther observes, that all the virtues are in the Gods. For many Gods, says he, are adorned with their appellations; and all goodness originates from the Gods. Likewise, prior, to things which sometimes participate the virtues, as is our case, it is necessary there should be natures which always participate them. In what order, therefore, do the virtues appear? Shall we say in the psychical? For virtue is the perfection of the soul; and election and pre-election are the energies and projections of the soul. Hence the Chaldæan oracles conjoin fontal virtue with fontal soul, or in other words, with soul subsisting according to cause. But may it not also be said, that the virtues naturally wish to give an orderly arrangement to that which is disordered? If this be admitted, they will originate from the demiurgic order. How then will they be cathartic there? May we not say, Olympiodorus adds, that through the cathartic virtues considered according to their causal subsistence in Jupiter the demiurgus, he is enabled to abide in his accustomed mode, as Plato says in the Timæus? And farther still, according to ancient theologists, he ascends to the tower of Saturn, who is a _pure_ intellect.

As this distribution of the virtues, however, is at present no less novel than important, the following discussion of them from the Αφορμαι προς τα νοητα, or Auxiliaries to Intelligibles, of Porphyry, is added for the sake of the genuinely philosophic reader:

“There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character, and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and on this account is called theoretic, and is now a beholder. And there are also other virtues pertaining to intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation of the passions, are characterised by following and being obedient to the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to an innoxious converse with neighbours, they are denominated, from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And prudence indeed subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible part; temperance, in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic with the reasoning part; and justice in each of these performing its proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence also, they are called purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions, and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues, therefore, adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it is necessary that he who is adorned by these, should abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body. Hence in purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize alone, gives subsistence to prudence; which derives its perfection through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly passive with the body, constitutes temperance. Not to fear a departure from body as into something void, and nonentity, gives subsistence to fortitude. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there is no resistance [from the irrational part,] justice is produced. The disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man conformable to nature. But the disposition according to the theoretic virtues, is beheld in apathy;[108] the end of which is a similitude to God.

“Since, however, of purification one kind consists in purifying, but another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are surveyed according to both these significations of purification; for they purify the soul, and are present with purification. For the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so that if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul also was not good, but is that which is able to partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would not have become situated in evil. The good, therefore, of the soul consists in being united to its generator; but its evil, in an association with things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is two-fold; the one arising from an association with terrestrial natures; but the other from doing this with an excess of the passions. Hence all the political virtues, which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and are honorable. But the cathartic are more honorable, and liberate it from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul when purified should associate with its generator. Hence the virtue of it after its conversion consists in a scientific knowledge of [true] being; but this will not be the case unless conversion, precedes.

“There is therefore another genus of virtues after the cathartic and political, and which are the virtues of the soul energizing intellectually. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But justice consists in performing what is appropriate in a conformity to, and energizing according to intellect. Temperance is an inward conversion of the soul to intellect. And fortitude is apathy; according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others, alternately follow each other.

“The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting in intellect; which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance of its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[109]]. But fortitude is sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed, some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation in the passions. And he, indeed, who has the greater virtues has also necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has the less has also the greater virtues. Nor will he who possesses the greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different virtues. For the scope of the political virtues, is to give measure to the passions in their practical energies according to nature. But the scope of the cathartic virtues, is entirely to obliterate the remembrance of the passions. And the scope of the rest subsists analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes according to the practical virtues, is a _worthy_ man: but he who energizes according to the cathartic virtues, is _a dæmoniacal man_, or is also _a good dæmon_. He who energizes according to the intellectual virtues alone, is _a God_. But he who energizes according to the paradigmatic virtues, _is the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought especially to pay attention to the cathartic virtues, since we may obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the more honorable virtues. Hence it is requisite to survey to what degree purification may be extended. For it is a separation from body, and from the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may so effected, and to what extent, must now be said.

“In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it, know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet at the same time his attention is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through sense[110] in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or pains of sensibles, in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified. _This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from pain, in order that [the rational part] may not be impeded [in its energies._] Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible, it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul is not co-passive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part. _That however which is unpremeditated is imbecile and small._ All fear, likewise, must be expelled. For he who acquires this purification, will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be unpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated. Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not desire meats and drinks. Neither must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; _but if this should take place, it must only be as far as to that precipitate imagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the intellectual soul itself of the purified man, must be liberated from all these [corporeal propensities.] He must likewise endeavour that what is moved to the irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy, and without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power. This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding to its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without opposition. Hence in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason, that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions, but at length terminate in apathy, for when co-passivity is entirely exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from it. For passion becomes moved, when reason imparts excitation, through verging [to the irrational nature.]”

P. 279. _The theorems of philosophy are to be enjoyed, as much as possible, as if they were ambrosia and nectar, &c. &c._

This Sentence in the original of Arcerius is as follows: των κατα φιλοσοφιαν θεωρηματων απολαυστεον, εφ’ οσον οιον, καθαπερ αμβροσιας και νεκταρος· ακηρατον τε γαρ το απ’ αυτων ηδυ και το θειον το μεγαλοψυχον δυναται τε ποιειν, και ει μη αïδιους, αïδιων γε επιστημονας.

In the edition of the Protreptics by Kiessling, which I did not see, till the greater part of this work was printed, σοφιαν is substituted for φιλοσοφιαν, but in my opinion very erroneously; and this German editor, from not perceiving the necessity of reading ακηρατον τε γαρ το απ’ αυτων ηδυ και θειον, το μεγαλοψυχον, κ. λ. instead of retaining the reading of Arcerius, has made nonsense of this part of the Sentence. For his version of it is: “Nam et sincera est eorum dulcedo, et divinam naturam, animum magnum efficere possunt.”

FOOTNOTES

[1]Οιδα μεν ουν και Πλατωνα τον μεγαν, και μετα τουτον ανδρα τοις χρονοις μεν, ου τῃ μην φυσει, καταδεεστερον, τον Χαλκιδεα φημι τον Ιαμβλιχον, κ. λ. Julian. Orat. IV.

Thus too the celebrated Bullialdus, in his Notes on Theo of Smyrna, speaks of Iamblichus as a man of a most acute genius.

[2]There is a Greek and Latin edition of this admirable work by Gale, under the title of Iamblichus De Mysteriis.

[3]Αλλα και το της λεξεως κομματικον, και αφοριστικον, και το των εννοιων πραγματικον, και γλαφυρον, και ενθουν, κ. λ. See the Testimonies prefixed by Gale to his edition of the above-mentioned work.

[4]This Sopater succeeded Plotinus in his philosophical school.

[5]The exact time of Iamblichus’ death is unknown. It is however certain that it was during the reign of Constantine; and according to the accurate Fabricius, prior to the year of Christ 333. Vid. Biblioth. Græc. Tom. IV. p. 283.

[6]This Sextus is probably the same that Seneca so greatly extols, and from whom he derives many of those admirable sentences with which his works abound. Vid. Senecæ Epistolas, 59, 64, 98, et lib. 2 de Irâ, c. 36, et lib. 3. c. 36.

[7]All these were published in one vol. 12mo. by Mr. Bridgman, under the title of Translations from the Greek, in the year 1804, and well deserve to be perused by the liberal reader.

[8]i. e. Having black leaves.

[9]i. e. It must not be admitted, that Apollo was actually connected with Pythaïs; for this would be absurd in the extreme; but the assertion of Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xenocrates must be considered as one of those mythological narrations in which heroes are said to have Gods for their fathers, or Goddesses for their mothers, and the true meaning of it is as follows: According to the ancient theology, between those perpetual attendants of a divine nature called _essential_ heroes, who are impassive and pure, and the bulk of human souls who descend to earth with passivity and impurity, it is necessary there should be an order of human souls who descend with impassivity and purity. For as there is no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that the last link of a superior order, should coalesce with the summit of one proximately inferior. These souls were called by the ancients, _terrestrial_ heroes, on account of their high degree of proximity and alliance to such as are essentially heroes. Hercules, Theseus, Pythagoras, Plato, &c. were souls of this kind, who descended into mortality both to benefit other souls, and in compliance with that necessity by which all natures inferior to the perpetual attendants of the Gods are at times obliged to descend.

But as, according to the arcana of ancient theology, every God beginning from on high produces his proper series as far as to the last of things, and this series comprehends many essences different from each other, such as Dæmoniacal, Heroical, Nymphical, and the like; the lowest powers of these orders, have a great communion and physical sympathy with the human race, and contribute to the perfection of all their natural operations, and particularly to their procreations. “Hence” (says Proclus in MSS. Schol. in Crat.) “it often appears, that _heroes_ are generated from the mixture of these powers with mankind; for those that possess a certain prerogative above human nature, are properly denominated _heroes_.” He adds: “Not only a dæmoniacal genus of this kind sympathizes physically with men, but other kinds sympathize with other natures, as Nymphs with trees, others with fountains, and others with stags or serpents.”

Olympiodorus, in his life of Plato, observes of that philosopher, “That an Apolloniacal spectre is said to have had connexion with Perictione his mother, and that appearing in the night to his father Aristo, it commanded him not to sleep with Perictione during the time of her pregnancy; which mandate Aristo obeyed.” The like account of the divine origin of Plato, is also given by Apuleius, Plutarch, and Hesychius.

[10]i. e. The priests of Jupiter.

[11]From what has been said in the note, p. 4, respecting the divine origin of Pythagoras, it follows that he was a _terrestrial hero_ belonging to the series of Apollo. Thus too the Esculapius who once lived on the earth, and was the inventor of medicine, proceeded, according to the ancient mythology, from the God Esculapius, who subsists in Apollo, just as the hero Bacchus proceeded from the Bacchus who subsists in Jupiter. Hence the Emperor Julian (apud Cyril.) says of Esculapius: “I had almost forgotten the greatest of the gifts of Jupiter and the Sun, but I have very properly reserved it to the last. For it is not peculiar to us only, but is common also, I think, to our kindred the Greeks. For Jupiter, in intelligibles, generated from himself Esculapius; but he was unfolded into light on the earth, through the prolific light of the sun. He therefore, proceeding from heaven to the earth, appeared uniformly in a human shape about Epidaurus. But thence becoming multiplied in his progressions, he extended his saving right hand to all the earth. He came to Pergamus, to Ionia, to Tarentum, and afterwards to Rome. Thence he went to the island Co, afterwards to Ægas, and at length to wherever there is land and sea. Nor did we individually, but collectively, experience his beneficence. And at one and the same time, he corrected souls that were wandering in error, and bodies that were infirm.”

[12]Those Gods, according to the Orphic theology, that contain in themselves the first principle of stability, sameness, and being, and who also were the suppliers of conversion to all things, are of a male characteristic; but those that are the causes of all-various progressions, separations, and measures of life, are of a feminine peculiarity.

[13]This inventor of names was called by the Egyptians Theuth, as we are informed by Plato in the Philebus and Phædrus; in the latter of which dialogues, Socrates says: “I have heard, that about Naucratis in Egypt, there was one of the ancient Gods of the Egyptians, to whom a bird was sacred, which they call Ibis; but the name of the dæmon himself was Theuth. According to tradition, this God first discovered number and the art of reckoning, geometry and astronomy, the games of chess and hazard, and likewise letters.” On this passage I observe as follows, in Vol. 3. of my translation of Plato: The genus of disciplines belonging to Mercury, contains gymnastic, music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the art of speaking and writing. This God, as he is the source of invention, is called the son of Maia; because _investigation_, which is implied by _Maia_, produces _invention_: and as unfolding the will of Jupiter, who is an intellectual God, he is the cause of mathesis or discipline. He first subsists in Jupiter, the artificer of the world; next among the supermundane Gods; in the third place, among the liberated Gods; fourthly, in the planet Mercury; fifthly, in the Mercurial order of dæmons; sixthly, in human souls, who are the attendants of this God; and in the seventh degree, his properties subsist in certain animals, such as the ibis, the ape, and sagacious dogs. The narration of Socrates in this place, is both allegorical and anagogic or reductory. Naucratis is a region of Egypt eminently subject to the influence of Mercury, though the whole of Egypt is allotted to this divinity. Likewise, in this city a man once florished full of the Mercurial power, because his soul formerly existed in the heavens of the Mercurial order. But he was first called Theuth, that is, Mercury, and a God, because his soul subsisted according to the perfect similitude of this divinity. But afterwards a dæmon, because from the God Mercury, through a Mercurial dæmon, gifts of this kind are transmitted to a Mercurial soul.

[14]Iamblichus derived this very beautiful passage from Heraclides Ponticus, as is evident from Cicero, Tusc. Quæst. lib. v. 3. who relates the same thing of Pythagoras, from the aforesaid author.

[15]i. e. With intelligibles properly so called.

[16]Iliad, lib. 17. The translation by Pope.

[17]“The Pythagoreans,” says Simplicius, in his Commentary on the 2d book of Aristotle’s treatise On the Heavens, said, “that an harmonic sound was produced from the motion of the celestial bodies, and they scientifically collected this from the analogy of their intervals; since not only the ratios of the sun and moon, of Venus and Mercury, but also of the other stars, were discovered by them.” Simplicius adds, “Perhaps the objection of Aristotle to this assertion of the Pythagoreans, may be solved according to the philosophy of those men, as follows:

“All things are not commensurate with each other, nor is every thing sensible to every thing, even in the sublunary region. This is evident from dogs who scent animals at a great distance, and which are not smelt by men. How much more, therefore, in things which are separated by so great an interval as those which are incorruptible from the corruptible, and celestial from terrestrial natures, is it true to say, that the sound of divine bodies is not audible by terrestrial ears? But if any one like Pythagoras, who is reported to have heard this harmony, should have his terrestrial body exempt from him, and his luminous and celestial vehicle[17a] and the senses which it contains purified, either through a good allotment, or through probity of life, or through a perfection arising from sacred operations, such a one will perceive things invisible to others, and will hear things inaudible by others. With respect to divine and immaterial bodies, however, if any sound is produced by them, it is neither percussive nor destructive, but it excites the powers and energies of sublunary sounds, and perfects the sense which is co-ordinate with them. It has also a certain analogy to the sound which concurs with the motion of terrestrial bodies. But the sound which is with us in consequence of the sonorific nature of the air, is a certain energy of the motion of their impassive sound. If, then, air is not passive there, it is evident that neither will the sound which is there be passive. Pythagoras, however, seems to have said that he heard the celestial harmony, as understanding the harmonic proportions in numbers, of the heavenly bodies, and that which is audible in them. Some one, however, may very properly doubt why the stars are seen by our visive sense, but the sound of them is not heard by our ears? To this we reply that neither do we see the stars themselves; for we do not see their magnitudes, or their figures, or their surpassing beauty. Neither do we see the motion through which the sound is produced; but we see as it were such an illumination of them, as that of the light of the sun about the earth, the sun himself not being seen by us. Perhaps too, neither will it be wonderful, that the visive sense, as being more immaterial, subsisting rather according to energy than according to passion, and very much transcending the other senses, should be thought worthy to receive the splendor and illumination of the celestial bodies, but that the other senses should not be adapted for this purpose. Of these, however, and such like particulars, if any one can assign more probable causes, let him be considered as a friend, and not as an enemy.”

[17a]The soul has three vehicles, one etherial, another aerial, and the third this terrestrial body. The first, which is luminous and celestial, is connate with the essence of the soul, and in which alone it resides in a state of bliss in the stars. In the second, it suffers the punishment of its sins after death. And from the third it becomes an inhabitant of earth.

[18]i. e. Of the discursive energy of reason, or that part of the soul that reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect.

[19]Kuster, one of the editors of this Life of Pythagoras, not perceiving that these auditions are both questions and answers, has made them to be questions only, and in consequence of this was completely at a loss to conceive the meaning of οπερ εστιν η αρμονια, εν ῃ αι Σειρηνες. Hence, he thinks it should be, τι εστιν η αρμονια ῃ ηδον αι Σειρηνες; but is not satisfied with this reading after all. Something I have no doubt is wanting; but the sense of the passage is, I conceive, that which is given in the above translation.

[20]“Pythagoras,” (says Proclus in MSS. Schol. in Cratylum,) “being asked what was the wisest of things, said it was number; and being asked what was the next in wisdom, said, he who gave names to things. But by number, he obscurely signified the intelligible order, which comprehends the multitude of intellectual forms: for there that which is the first, and properly number, subsists after the superessential one.[20a] This likewise supplies the measures of essence to all beings, in which also true wisdom, and knowledge which is of itself, and which is converted to and perfects itself, subsist. And as there the intelligible, intellect, and intelligence, are the same, so there also number and wisdom are the same. But by the founder of names, he obscurely signified the soul, which indeed subsists from intellect, and is not things themselves like the first intellect, but possesses the images and essential transitive reasons of them as statues of beings. Being, therefore, is imparted to all things from intellect, which knows itself and is replete with wisdom; but that they are denominated is from soul, which imitates intellect. Pythagoras therefore said, that it was not the business of any casual person to fabricate names, but of one looking to intellect and the nature of things.”

[20a]i. e. Number according to cause, which subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order. For number according to hyparxis or essence, subsists at the summit of the order which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See the 3d book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

[21]The words περι πυθαγορειων are omitted in the original, but from the Protrept. of Iamblichus evidently ought to be inserted.

[22]The same thing is said by the Pythagoreans to have befallen the person who first divulged the theory of incommensurable quantities. See the first scholium on the 10th book of Euclid’s Elements, in Commandine’s edition, fol. 1572.

[23]Iamblichus, in this list of Pythagoreans, must not be supposed to enumerate those only who were contemporary with Pythagoras: since, if he did, he contradicts what he says of Philolaus in Chap. 31. viz. “that he was many ages posterior to Pythagoras;” but those in general who came from the school of Pythagoras, and were his most celebrated disciples.

[24]From this passage it is evident that Iamblichus had many sources of information, which are unknown to modern critics; and this circumstance alone ought to check their pedagogical impertinence.

[25]For αυτα here I read, conformably to the version of Obrechtus, αλλα.

[26]For δηγμους here, I read οδυρμους; as I do not see what morsus has to do with this place. Obrechtus has in his version “pectorisque morsus;” but I have no doubt _lamentations_ is the proper word, which aptly associates with despondency.

[27]“Well-instituted polities,” (says Proclus in MS. Comment. in Alcibiad. prior.) “are averse to the art of playing on wind-instruments; and therefore neither does Plato admit it. The cause of this is the variety of this instrument, the pipe, which shows that the art which uses it should be avoided. For instruments called Panarmonia, and those consisting of many strings, are imitations of pipes. For every hole of the pipe emits, as they say, three sounds at least; but if the cavity above the holes be opened, then each hole will emit more than three sounds.”

[28]Odyss. lib. 4.

[29]Iamblichus derived what he has said in this chapter about music, from Nicomachus.

[30]The first part of this sentence in the original is ξενου τινος εκβεβληκοτος εν Ασκληπιειῳ Ζωνην χρυσιον εχουσαν, and in translating it I have followed the version of Obrechtus, because it appeared to me to convey the meaning of Iamblichus, though the translation is certainly forced, and not such as the natural construction of the words will admit. The translation of Arcerius is, “Cum hospes quidam in æde Æsculapii fœminam zonam auream habentem ejecisset;” and this is perfectly conformable to the natural construction of the words, but then it is void of sense.

[31]This history is copiously narrated in chap. 33.

[32]See chap. 33.

[33]These lines are as the numbers 4, 3, 2. For 4 to 3 is sesquitertian, 3 to 2 is sesquialter, and 2 is an arithmetical medium between 4 and 3.

[34]For an explanation of this assertion of Plato in the Republic, see my Theoretic Arithmetic.

[35]“The Pythagoreans,” (says Syrianus in Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 13.) “received from the theology of Orpheus, the principles of intelligible and intellectual numbers, they assigned them an abundant progression, and extended their dominion as far as to sensibles themselves.” Hence that proverb was peculiar to the Pythagoreans, that _all things are assimilated to number_. Pythagoras, therefore, in the Sacred Discourse, clearly says, that “number is the ruler of forms and ideas, and is the cause of Gods and dæmons.” He also supposes, that “to the most ancient and artificially ruling deity, number is the canon, the artificial reason, the intellect also, and the most undeviating balance of the composition and generation of all things.” αυτος μεν Πυθαγορας, εν τῳ ιερῳ λογῳ, διαρρηδην μορφων και ιδεων κραντορα τον αριθμον ελεγεν ειναι, και θεων και δαιμονων αιτιον· και τῳ πρεσβυτατῳ και κρατιστευοντι τεχνιτῃ θεῳ κανονα, και λογον τεχνικον, νουν τε και σταθμαν ακλινεσταταν τον αριθμον υπεικε συστασιος και γενεσεως των παντων. Syrianus adds, “But Philolaus declared that number is the governing and self-begotten bond of the eternal permanency of mundane natures.” Φιλολαυς δε, της των κοσμικων αιωνιας διαμονης την κρατιστευουσαν και αυτογενη συοχην ειναι απεφῃνατο τον αριθμον. “And Hippasus, and all those who were destined to a quinquennial silence, called number the judicial instrument of the maker of the universe, and the first paradigm of mundane fabrication.” οι δε περι Ιππασον ακουσματικοι ειπον κριτικον κοσμουργου θεου οργανον, και παραδειγμα πρωτον κοσμοποιϊας. “But how is it possible they could have spoken thus sublimely of number, unless they had considered it as possessing an essence separate from sensible, and a transcendency fabricative, and at the same time paradigmatic?”

[36]i. e. To spheres; Iamblichus indicating by this, that Pythagoras as well as Orpheus considered a spherical figure as the most appropriate image of divinity. For the universe is spherical; and, as Iamblichus afterwards observes, the Gods have a nature and _morphe_ similar to the universe; _morphe_, as we learn from Simplicius, pertaining to the color, figure, and magnitude of superficies. Keissling, having no conception of this meaning, and supposing the whole passage to be corrupt, has made nonsense of it by his alterations. For according to his version, Pythagoras, after the manner of Orpheus, worshipped the Gods not bound to a human form, but _to divine numbers_. For instead of ιδρυμασι he reads αριθμοις. But divine numbers both according to Orpheus and Pythagoras are the Gods themselves.

[37]i. e. Futurity is long; Pythagoras signifying by this, that those who do not take an oath religiously, will be punished in some future period, if they are not at present.

[38]i. e. From the time in which the Gods are fabulously said to have reigned in Egypt.

[39]I wonder that the learned Obrechtus should translate ηβηδον, _cum omni juventute sua_. Had his translation, which is on the whole very excellent, been reviewed by English or Scotch critics, they would have immediately said from this circumstance, that he did not understand Greek.

[40]Iamblichus here alludes to a right-angled triangle, and the Pythagoric theorem of 47. 1 of Euclid. For the square described on the longest side is equal to the two squares described on the two other sides. The longest side therefore is said by geometricians to be equal in power to the powers of the other sides. This however Kiessling not understanding, says, “that power is the space contained between the concurring lines of figures, and is the area of the triangle.” “Δυναμις idem est, quod εμβαδον, spatium, quod infra concurrentes lineas figurarum continetur, area trigoni.” But Kiessling, though a good verbalist, is a bad geometrician, and no philosopher.

[41]In the original δεκατον _the tenth month_; but as it very seldom happens that a woman is in a state of pregnancy more than nine months, it appears to me that for δεκατον we should read εκτον _the sixth month_, as in the above translation.

[42]Obrechtus by translating περι δε δοξης in this place, “De fama et gloria,” has evidently mistaken the meaning of Iamblichus.

[43]The wise and magnanimous Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics and Stoics, among the ancients, looked to virtue as its own reward, and performed what is right, because it is right to do so. And though they firmly believed in the immortality of the soul, their conduct was not at all influenced by the hope of future reward. This great truth indeed, that virtue brings with it its own recompense, is almost at present obsolete; and it is no unusual thing to hear a man, when afflicted, exclaiming with Methodistical cant,

“The many troubles that I meet, In getting to a Mercy-seat!”

[44]These energies are called beneficent, because they are of a purifying character. Hence Plato in the Timæus says, that a deluge is the consequence of the Gods _purifying_ the earth by water.

[45]Iamblichus a little before informs us, that Pythagoras suspected that Phalaris intended to put him to death, but at the same time knew that he was not destined to die by Phalaris. This being the case therefore, Pythagoras has no claim to fortitude in this instance, in being free from the fear of death. But he has great claim to it, when it is considered that he was in the power of a tyrant who might have caused him to suffer tortures worse than death.

[46]i. e. _Humble_ (ταπεινης ουσης.) With the Pythagoreans, therefore, humility was no virtue, though in modern times it is considered to be the greatest of the virtues. With Aristotle likewise it is no virtue; for in his Nicomachean Ethics he says, “that all humble men are flatterers, and all flatterers are humble.”

[47]See the Cave of Plato, in the 7th book of his Republic.

[48]The original is, Μητροδωρος τε ο Θυρσου του πατρος Επιχαρμου, which Obrechtus erroneously translates, “Metrodorus Epicharmi filius Thyrsi nepos.”

[49]This observation applies also to those of the present day, who, from a profound ignorance of human nature, attempt to enlighten by education the _lowest_ class of mankind. For this, as I have elsewhere observed, is an attempt to break the golden chain of beings, to disorganise society, and to render the vulgar dissatisfied with the servile situations in which God and nature intended them to be placed. See p. 73. of the introduction to my translation of Select Works of Plotinus.

[50]This also is asserted, as I have before observed, in the Scholia on the 10th book of Commandine’s edition of Euclid’s Elements, p. 122.

[51]Obrechtus has omitted to translate the words ηδη πρεσβυτην οντα, “being now an elderly man.”

[52]In the original ακρατος, which Obrechtus very erroneously translates _impotens_.

[53]i. e. To the Pythagoreans.

[54]The whole of this paragraph, the greater part of which is a repetition of what has been said elsewhere, does not certainly belong to this place.

[55]In the original, και την γην αναδαστον εποιησαν, which Obrechtus erroneously translates, “et agrorum divisionem introduxerunt.”

[56]The words within the brackets are from a Latin Manuscript, which was in the possession of Fabricius.

[57]In the original, ουδεν γαρ αυταρκες, ο τουτων των μοριων ποιει το ολον. This Canter erroneously translates, “Quandoquidem horum nulla pars totum queat constituere.” And Gale has noticed the error.

[58]Gale says in his notes, that after οφθαλμων he adds φυσιος, but he should evidently have added αρετα, as in the above translation.

[59]In the original συν τᾳ οξυδορκιᾳ, which Canter very defectively translates, _videndi facultate_.

[60]For ου μετριαν here, I read ασυμμετριαν.

[61]i. e. So far as he is considered as energizing in conjunction with the body; but so far as he has an energy independent of the body, viz. so far as he is a rational soul, the body is not to be considered as a part of his essence. And the energy of the rational soul by itself alone, without any assistance from the corporeal organs, constitutes the true man, into the definition of which body does not enter.

[62]Canter, in his version of these Pythagoric fragments, uniformly translates ευτυχια _felicitas_, contrary to the obvious meaning of the word, as is evident in this, and many other passages. It is also directly contrary to what Aristotle says in cap. 13. lib. 7. of his Nicomachean Ethics: δια δε το προσδεισθαι της τυχης, δοκει τισι ταυτον ειναι η ευτυχια τῃ ευδαιμονιᾳ, ουκ ουσα· επει και αυτη υπερβαλλουσα, εμποδιος εστι. i. e. “Because felicity requires fortune, it appears to some persons that prosperity is the same with felicity. This however is not the case; since prosperity, when it is excessive, is an impediment to felicity.” But Canter did not, I believe, pretend to have any knowledge of philosophy: and Gale, who did, has not corrected him in this and many other places in which he has erred through the want of this knowledge. Gale however, though verbally learned, was but a garrulous smatterer in philosophy, as is evident from his notes on Iamblichus de Mysteriis.

[63]For επιπρεπειαν here, I read απρεπειαν.

[64]In the original, ωστε ουδεποκα δει θαυμαινεν, ει παντ’ αντεστραμμενως ενιοκα κρινεται, τας αληθινας διαθεσιος μεταπιπτοισας, which Canter erroneously translates as follows: “Quocirca mirandum non est, si cuncta nonnunquam, verâ affectione mutatâ, aliter eveniunt.” Nor is the error noticed by Gale.

[65]i. e. In the etherial vehicle of the soul, which when the soul energizes intellectually is spherical, and is moved circularly. This vehicle also is αυγοειδης, or luciform, throughout diaphanous, and of a star-like nature. Hence Marcus Antoninus beautifully observes: σφαιρα ψυχης αυτοειδης, (lege αυγοειδης) οταν μητε εκτεινηται επι τι, μητε εσω συντρεχῃ μητε συνιζανῃ, αλλα φωτι λαμπηται, ῳ την αληθειαν ορᾳ την παντων, και την εν αυτῃ. Lib. II. i. e. “The sphere of the soul is then luciform, when the soul is neither extended to any thing [external] nor inwardly concurs with it, nor is depressed by it, but is illuminated with a light by which she sees the truth of all things, and the truth that is in herself.”

[66]M. Meibomius observes, that Canter did not see that λογιστικω should be written in this place for αλογω. Canter however was right in retaining αλογω. For the dianoetic is the same with the logistic part of the soul; and it is evident that a part of the soul different from the dianoetic is here intended to be signified. Besides, as Aristotle shows in his Nicomachean Ethics, when the irrational becomes obedient to the rational part of the soul, the former then prohibits and vanquishes base appetites in conjunction with the latter.

[67]viz. Such as have the theoretic virtues.

[68]i. e. Such as have the ethical and political virtues.

[69]The original is, α δε δυναμις, οιον αλκα τις τω σκανεος, ᾳ υφισταμεθα, και εμμενομες τοις πραγμασιν. This sentence in its present state is certainly unintelligible. For σκανεος therefore, I read φυσεως, and then the sense will be as in the above translation. The version of Canter is certainly absurd; for it is, “Facultas tanquam robur et causæ, quo ferimus, et in rebus permanemus.” And Gale, as usual, takes no notice of the absurdity.

[70]viz., The equal and that which is arranged, belong to the order of bound, and the unequal and that which is without arrangement, to the order of infinity. And bound and infinity are the two great principles of things after the ineffable cause of all. See the third book of my translation of Proclus, On the Theology of Plato.

[71]viz. The salvation of the universe arises from the co-adaptation of the sublunary region to the heavens.

[72]In the Greek επῳδας; on which Gale observes, “Forte αμαθιας, nisi aliud subsit mysterium.” But it appears to me that there is no occasion to substitute any other word for επῳδας. For in the education of youth, it is certainly requisite to unite allurement with erudition. And the substitution of αμαθιας, _ignorance_, is monstrous.

[73]In the original αυτα γαρ α διενεργουσα, instead of which Gale proposes to read αυτα γαρ αδε ενεργοισα, which still leaves the sentence involved in obscurity. But if for διενεργουσα we read διοριζουσα as in the above translation, the meaning is clear.

[74]For νοηται in this place, I read φυεται.

[75]Neither of the Latin translators North and Arcerius have understood this passage, and therefore have erroneously translated it. For the original is: και παντα τα εν τᾳ συστοιχειᾳ και ταξει τα εκεινου κατακεχωρισμενα. This North translates: “Atque omnia in rerum serie et ordine ab illo separata.” But Arcerius: “Atque omnia quæ sunt in naturæ cognatione ordineque ab illo separata.” By the things however co-ordinate with, and successive to God, Archytas means the other Gods, who, though subordinate to the supreme, yet in consequence of partaking of the same nature, are said to be co-ordinate with him. Gale, likewise, did not perceive the error of the Latin translators.

[76]Plato says this of God in his Laws.

[77]The above sentences are from Stobæi Sententiæ, p. 3. (the edition that of 1609,) and are ascribed to Pythagoras.

[78]The above seven sentences are to be found in p. 4. of Stobæus, and as it appears to me are erroneously ascribed to Socrates. For I conceive them to have been written either by Democrates or Demophilus.

[79]Stob. p. 48.

[80]Hence the dogma of the Stoics derived its origin, that the wise man is independent of Fortune.

[81]Stob. p. 65. These three sentences are ascribed to Pythagoras.

[82]Stob. p. 80. These two sentences are ascribed to Socrates, but I have no doubt originally formed a part of the sentences of Demophilus.

[83]Stob. p. 104. This sentence is ascribed to Democritus in Stobæus, but has doubtless either Democrates or Demophilus for its author.

[84]Stob. p. 147. The above four sentences, are in Stobæus ascribed to Socrates; but I refer them either to Democrates or Demophilus.

[85]This sentence in Stobæus is ascribed to Socrates, as is also the one which immediately precedes it, viz. “The wealth of the avaricious man, like the sun descending under the earth, delights no living thing.” But as this sentence is to be found among the Similitudes of Demophilus, there can be no doubt of the other belonging to the same work.

[86]This and the preceding sentence, are in Stobæus ascribed to Democritus, but I attribute them to Democrates or Demophilus.

[87]This sentence in Stobæus is ascribed to Pythagoras, but, excepting the part within the brackets, is to be found among the sentences of Demophilus.

[88]This sentence in Stobæus, is ascribed to Democritus, and that immediately preceding it, to Socrates; but I ascribe both of them to Democrates, or Demophilus.

[89]This and the preceding sentences, together with two other sentences that accompany them, are in Stobæus ascribed to Democritus; but as the other two are to be found in the Collection of Democrates, there can be no doubt that all of them are from the same author.

[90]For as every cause of existence to a thing, is better than that thing, so far as the one is cause and the other effect; thus also that which gives a name to any thing is better than the thing named, so far as it is named, i. e. so far as pertains to its possession of a name. For the nominator is the cause, and the name the effect.

[91]In the Latin it is “post _dispositionem_ corporis.” But for _dispositionem_ it is evidently necessary to read _dissolutionem_.

[92]This is conformable to the well-known Pythagoric precept, “Follow God.”

[93]“We can by no other means,” (says Porphyry De Abstinen. lib. I.) “obtain the true end of a contemplative, intellectual life than by _adhering_ to God, if I may be allowed the expression, as if fastened by a nail, at the same time being torn away and separated from body and corporeal delights; having procured safety from our deeds, and not from the mere attention to words.”

[94]But intellect is the recipient of wisdom, and therefore intellect is the true man. This also is asserted by Aristotle.

[95]In the Latin _fidelis_; but as Ruffinus, the Latin translator of these sentences, frequently adulterates the true meaning of Sextus, by substituting one word for another, I have no doubt that in this sentence the original was πεπαιδευμενος _eruditus_, and not πιστος _fidelis_. My reason for so thinking is, that in one of the sentences of Demophilus it is said, “that the life of _ignorant_ men is a disgrace,” των αμαθων ονειδος ειναι τον βιον; and this in the sentences of Sextus is, “Hominum _infidelium_ vita, opprobrium est.” If, therefore, Ruffinus translates αμαθων, _infidelium_, there is every reason to suppose that he would translate πεπαιδευμενος, _fidelis_.

[96]Several of these sentences as published by Arcerius, are in a very defective state; but which, as the learned reader will perceive, I have endeavoured to amend in my translation of them.

[97]This work is unfortunately lost.

[98]According to Ælian and Suidas also, _melanurus_ is a fish; but as the word signifies that which has a black termination, it is very appropriately used as a symbol of a material nature.

[99]viz. Those Gods that are characterized by the _intelligible_, and _intellect_. See my translation of Proclus, On the Theology of Plato.

[100]See the second edition of this work in Nos. 15 and 16 of the Pamphleteer.

[101]i. e. Natures which are not connected with body.

[102]See an extract of some length, and of the greatest importance, from this dialogue, in my translation of Select Works of Plotinus, p. 553, &c.

[103]Forms subsist at the extremity of the intelligible triad, which triad consists of _being_, _life_, and _intellect_. But being and life, with all they contain, subsist here involved in impartible union. See my Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

[104]In Aristot. Metaphys. Lib. 13.

[105]Because ¾ is to ⅔ as 9 to 8.

[106]In Mathemat. p. 147.

[107]Instead of περιττουται, it is necessary to read περατουται; the necessity of which emendation, I wonder the learned Bullialdus did not observe.

[108]This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.

[109]The words και δικαιοσυνη are omitted in the original. But it is evident from Plotinus, that they ought to be inserted.

[110]Instead of κατ’ αυτην here, it is necessary to read κατ’ αισθησιν.

THE END.

Transcriber’s Notes

—Silently corrected a few typos.

—Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication.

—Added a Table of Contents based on the chapter headings in the text.

—In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by _underscores_.